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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents an overview of Phenomenological Phonology (PP), including its 
metatheory, theory and application, for comparison with Cognitive Phonology (CP). While PP 
and CP are in close agreement at the theory level, there are some significant differences at the 
level of metatheory. PP considers phonological terms (such as phoneme and word) to be 
words like any others, and gives detailed consideration to the concepts behind such terms. It 
also considers pronunciation to be a form of behaviour, driven by concepts created through 
general concept-formation processes. This has important consequences for practical 
application in the areas of pronunciation and literacy teaching. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper offers an overview of Phenomenological Phonology, with the aim of inviting 
comparison with Cognitive Phonology (Langacker, 1987; Taylor, 2002). Phenomenological 
Phonology (PP) is similar in many ways to Cognitive Phonology (CP), but there are also a 
number of differences. Should PP be thought of as the same as CP, a branch of CP, or 
something different altogether? And does anything much hinge on the answer? 
Since an important feature of PP is its explicit linking of metatheory, theory and 
practice, this paper, despite space limitations, covers key aspects of all three. The first part 
gives an overview of the metatheoretical framework (for more detailed background see 
Fraser, 1992, in press). The second part briefly presents some implications of the framework 
for phonological theory (see also Fraser, 1997, 2004b). Finally, some examples are given of 
the effect of following these implications on the practical task of pronunciation teaching 
(Fraser, 2001, 2004a, 2006).  
 
II. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
II.1. Overview 
 
Phenomenology is a complex set of philosophical ideas (Spiegelberg, 1982). This paper 
focuses on just one general aspect, its recognition of three distinct levels of analysis: the level 
of words, the level of reality and, mediating between the two, the level of concepts.  
These three levels of analysis are very familiar to Cognitive Linguistics, partly because 
of the influence of phenomenology, through structuralism and post structuralism, on 
contemporary scholarship in general, and partly because linguistics itself, through the work of 
key figures such as Saussure, Whorf and their successors, has played an important role in 
developing a detailed understanding of the three levels and their relationships (Carroll, 1956; 
de Saussure, 1986). However, phenomenology pursues implications of the three levels of 
analysis that are not so familiar. 
The most important of these implications follows from recognition that words and 
concepts do not emerge from nothing, but are created and used by a person. Recognition of 
the levels therefore requires recognition of a Subject. The Subject is a generalised and 
theorised version of the person who creates and uses words and concepts, as opposed to a 
subject (lower case ‘s’), which is a specific person. There is thus an important distinction 
between the terms Subjective, meaning ‘requiring theoretical acknowledgement of a 
Phonological Concepts and Concept Formation: Metatheory, Theory and Application 
 
© Servicio de Publicaciones. Universidad de Murcia. All rights reserved.            IJES, vol. 6 (2), 2006, pp. 55-75 
57
‘someone’ who creates concepts and words’, and subjective, meaning ‘restricted to the 
viewpoint of a specific person’. 
The Subject is acknowledged by a range of theories, but Phenomenology is distinctive 
in putting the Subject in central position, starting any analysis with explicit consideration of 
the Subject who creates the words and concepts used in the analysis. This can be especially 
useful when, as in the scientific study of language and cognition, there are two Subjects: one, 
the scientist, making a theoretical analysis of the other, an element in the scientist’s theory.  
A less well known but very significant contribution of Phenomenology, stemming 
directly from its focus on the role of the Subject in creating words and concepts, is 
observation of the ease with which the three levels of analysis (word, concept and reality) can 
become confused, and the undesirable effects on theory that can follow. More than simply 
observing this, Phenomenology has developed a method for avoiding this confusion.  
The following sections provide more detail about each of the three levels of analysis, 
the role of the Subject, and the method for minimising confusion among the levels. Some of 
the ideas will be familiar to readers with a background in Cognitive Linguistics. However the 
use made of the ideas in PP is, as will be seen, somewhat different. 
 
II.2. Reality 
 
The level of reality is covered by a range of technical terms in Phenomenology (e.g. World, 
Life World), each with important distinctions in meaning, but the everyday word reality 
serves well for the present discussion. Reality is the world as it is, as opposed to how people 
think it is or would like it to be, or how it might potentially or ideally be. People and their 
artefacts are part of reality and can influence reality, but reality exists independently of any 
individual. Phenomenology is therefore not a form of idealism (the assertion that reality exists 
only in people’s minds). 
Reality is richly structured and highly complex, with a nature, or way of being, of its 
own. Through embodied experience, people can develop an unspoken or tacit understanding 
of reality. This understanding can be considered accurate, or realistic, to the extent that it 
allows people to survive and prosper as individuals and as a species. It is, however, inevitably 
partial, both in the sense of being limited, and in the sense of being subjective, constrained by 
the sensory systems and interpretive biases of the experiencer.  
It is also possible to describe reality with words or other symbols and representations. 
This is useful in communicating with others about reality but, since descriptions rest 
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ultimately on experience, they too are inevitably partial, again in both senses of the word. 
Reality is open to many alternative descriptions. Through the use of special methods and 
equipment, scientists can create descriptions of greater and greater detail and accuracy. 
However, reality is inexhaustible by any, or all, descriptions. There is always some ‘surplus’ 
beyond the description, and any one description inevitably obscures some aspects of reality, 
even as it may be revealing others.  
These points can be summed up by saying that reality in itself is ‘raw’. It has a nature 
of its own, but no self-existing description of its own. Ultimately, even the most detailed and 
accurate descriptions of reality rest on a tacit appeal to shared experience.  
 
 
II.3. Concepts 
 
The level of concepts is also given various technical terms in Phenomenology, as well as in 
other theories. Perhaps the best known term is mental representation. However, this term has 
a good deal of theoretical baggage (Shanon, 1993). Though the word concept was disallowed 
in technical discussion for some time due to the unobservability of concepts, it has now made 
a welcome return, partly thanks to Cognitive Linguistics (Taylor, 2002). 
Concepts are the Subject’s interpretation of, or way of thinking about, reality. Everyday 
reasoning about people’s thinking and behaviour involves constant reference to concepts in 
understanding why people do what they do, and predicting what they might be likely to do 
next, via an informal ‘theory of mind’ (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  
One of the most important things about concepts is that it is concepts of reality, not 
reality itself, that drive a person’s behaviour. People sometimes find this difficult to accept, 
preferring to explain behaviour, especially their own, with reference to reality (‘I ran away 
because of the tiger’) rather than with reference to their concepts (‘I ran away because of my 
concept of the tiger’). It is not too difficult to demonstrate, however, that it is not the tiger as 
such which causes the running, but a concept of the tiger (the tiger would not cause that 
behaviour in someone who did not know it was there, or did not know it was dangerous). 
Though concepts have an immense effect on reasoning and behaviour, concepts 
themselves are not directly observable. Indeed there is a sense in which they are necessarily 
invisible. Concepts are like a lens, or a pair of glasses, through which a person views the 
world. They greatly affect the person’s view of reality, but when people use concepts, they 
look through them rather than at them, and are generally unaware of them. When glasses are 
not in use, they can be taken off and looked at. Unfortunately concepts cannot be directly 
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observed in this way. They can be studied through consideration of their effect. However, as 
with glasses, it is difficult to study concepts while actually using them.  
Given their central importance to all aspects of life, concepts as such have been given 
surprisingly little direct study in the mainstream sciences of cognition, which have followed 
an analogy between human cognition and computer processing, and sought to avoid reference 
to concepts in favour of mental representations, which are, even if only principle, more 
tangible. Cognitive Linguistics is exceptional in taking conceptual structure as a central theme 
in theory development, and has contributed to a body of scientific knowledge about concepts, 
which includes the following general points (Murphy, 2002). 
Concepts are abstract with respect to reality. This is because they are formed through 
processes of abstraction from reality. Abstraction is a ‘drawing out’ (the etymological 
meaning of abstract) of those aspects of reality that are salient to a particular person at a 
particular time in a particular context. Abstraction requires a sense of contrast, or difference. 
It is common to say that a concept groups together aspects of reality that are similar. It is 
equally true, however, that concepts group together aspects of reality that are different from 
some other known aspect of reality. For example, developing the concept BROWN involves 
understanding what is ‘not-brown’ (Wittgenstein, 1958/1974). Cognitive Linguistics, 
following the work of Eleanor Rosch (e.g. Rosch, 1973), defines concepts in terms of 
categories, with ‘prototypical’ members at the centre of the category and more ‘peripheral’ 
members around an often ‘fuzzy’ boundary. 
The fact that the creation of concepts involves processes of abstraction means, 
importantly, that concepts are not simply a ‘mapping’ of physical characteristics of reality 
onto another level. Concepts are strongly influenced by context, culture and point of view - as 
well as by reality itself. The latter is important to emphasise because Phenomenology has 
often been wrongly thought of as focusing on subjective (note the small s) interpretation to 
the exclusion of reality (‘if I think it is art, it is art’). The phenomenological understanding of 
the relationship between concepts and reality can be seen via analogy with the potter and the 
clay. Reality is the clay, and the concept is the pot. The potter can shape the clay in many 
ways, but the nature of the pot is constrained by the nature of the clay. Similarly, reality can 
be conceptualised in many ways, but the nature of the resulting concepts is constrained 
(barring pathology) by the nature of reality.  
The fact that concepts do not simply map aspects of reality means that, while it can be 
useful to work with formal definitions of concepts for certain purposes, no concept can be 
fully defined with reference only to the physical or formal properties of the reality behind it 
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(Wittgenstein, 1958/1974). Rather, a concept embraces a collection of aspects of reality that 
seem ‘the same’ to a particular subject in a particular context, despite having often enormous 
physical differences. As is well known in Cognitive Linguistics, it is quite possible to have a 
category in which there is no single physical feature common to all members.  
 
II.4. Words 
 
The level of words is one with which everyone is familiar from everyday life. When people 
use words, they feel that they are referring directly to reality. However, this is an illusion, 
sometimes known as naive realism. Words refer not to reality but to concepts of reality.  
Words, like pictures, diagrams and other representations, are symbols not of reality but 
of concepts. The ability to use such symbols is an important part of what makes us human 
(Noble & Davidson, 1996). Words have the important function of allowing humans to reflect 
upon concepts, and think about the things they conceptualise even when they are not there. 
With the aid of symbols, people can compare and contrast concepts, consider similarities and 
differences among them, and draw out, or abstract, those features that are salient at the time 
and in the context. This gives the powerful ability to iteratively create new concepts at higher 
levels of abstraction. For example, having words for concepts of things that happen to be red 
and blue allows comparison of the things and abstraction of new, more abstract, concepts of 
RED and BLUE. By further comparing and contrasting, yet more abstract concepts such as 
COLOUR, or SCARLET, CRIMSON, AQUA, and ROYAL BLUE, can be created.  
By considering the processes of abstraction involved in the formation of concepts 
behind words, a hierarchy of abstractness can be defined. This hierarchy is similar to but 
somewhat different from the schema-instance hierarchy used in Cognitive Linguistics (Taylor, 
2002: Chapter 7). Basic concepts are similar to the basic concepts of Cognitive Linguistics, 
but concepts of both lower order and higher order terms in a taxonomy are considered in PP to 
be more abstract than basic level concepts, because they require more levels of abstraction by 
the Subject. Thus for example, both TOOL and CHAINSAW would be considered more abstract 
in PP than SAW. 
Applying a word to a concept, like creating a concept in the first place, is a process that 
requires tacit background understanding (Polanyi, 1966). Because of this, just as concepts are 
not a direct mapping of reality, so words are not a direct mapping of concepts. One concept 
can be symbolised by several words (synonymy), or one word can symbolise several concepts 
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(homonymy). It is possible to have a concept without having a word for it. Some concepts 
require not a word, but a whole sentence, for their expression. 
This is the reason behind the observation, very well known to Cognitive Linguistics, 
that determining the concept behind a word (its meaning) is not simply a matter of reading off 
a formal definition, but requires analysis of its use in a range of contexts.  
 
 
II.5. The Subject 
 
From what has been said so far, it is clear that the existence of concepts and words 
presupposes some processing of reality, in much the same way as the existence of a pot 
presupposes some processing of clay. The Subject is the doer of the processes of 
conceptualisation, abstraction, categorisation, and so on, conceived as a generalised 
theoretical being, rather than a specific person. It is important to clarify this definition. It is 
very far from implying that subjects (people) have only general or group characteristics, and 
not individual, personal characteristics. It was the major contribution of Heidegger to 
Phenomenology, in opposition to Husserl, to point out that personal, social and embodied 
characteristics were essential to people’s interaction with reality, and their ability to form 
concepts and use language. The general characteristics of the Subject therefore include 
provision for highly specific characteristics of each subject, based on its own embodied, social 
and subjective experience.  
Without the Subject, clearly, there could be no concepts or words. Interestingly, 
however, just as concepts are necessarily invisible as they are being used, so the Subject is 
invisible to itself while engaged in its projects. It takes an act of reflection for a Subject to 
become aware of its own characteristics, and the contribution of its own point of view to its 
concepts of reality. Even then, such awareness is necessarily partial. 
One of the Phenomenologists’ major contributions is their acknowledgement of and 
focus on the role of the Subject in creating words and concepts. This is not to say that the role 
of the Subject is denied in other philosophies. However, in other philosophies, the Subject, 
even if acknowledged in principle, tends to be regretted and avoided. A great deal of effort 
goes into defining the Subject so as to minimise any difference between the Subject and the 
material world (Stillings et al., 1987). Mainstream cognitive theory, for example, has 
achieved this avoidance of dualism via analogy between the human mind and a computer.  
Phenomenology, in strong contrast with mainstream theory, does not seek to avoid the 
Subject, but embraces the Subject, acknowledging the fundamental difference between the 
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Subject and other aspects of reality, and analysing with care the characteristics of the Subject 
that allow it to achieve processes such as conceptualisation, abstraction or categorisation. One 
important finding is that, since the processes involved in formation and use of concepts and 
words require a tacit background understanding not just of the concept itself but of the context 
in which it emerges (Polanyi, 1966), the Subject who creates words and concepts cannot be a 
computational device (Dreyfus, 1979).  
Through its recognition of the Subject, and analysis of the relationship between reality, 
concept and Subject, Phenomenology is able to transcend the traditional philosophical 
opposition between idealism and realism, while still avoiding dualism. It does this by 
distinguishing between existence and existence-as: an aspect of reality can exist in a ‘raw’ or 
undescribed state independently of any observer or Subject, but for it to exist-as (some 
description) - that is, to have a word attached to it - requires action, in particular the action of 
concept-formation, by a Subject. 
Most importantly of all, phenomenologists see themselves, in their role as philosophers, 
as Subjects in exactly the same sense as the Subject they postulate in their philosophy, and the 
terms of their theories as words in exactly the same sense as words of everyday language. 
 
II.6. The natural attitude 
 
One of Phenomenology’s most useful contributions, though one that has influenced other 
disciplines relatively little, is their concept of the Natural Attitude (Husserl, 1960). The 
Natural Attitude is the tendency to behave in everyday life as if words refer not to concepts 
but to reality.  
The Natural Attitude is somewhat like naive realism. However, it is not a theoretical 
‘ism’ but an informal attitude. As its name suggests, it is entirely natural, an inevitable 
consequence of the invisibility of concepts and the tendency of the Subject to focus outwards 
from itself when engaged in projects. People actually need the Natural Attitude when getting 
on with their lives and engaging in projects. There are many times, for example, when it is 
much better to accept the convenient fiction that the word dog refers to an actual dog than to 
waste time on reminders that it really refers to someone’s concept of a dog.  
On the other hand, it is possible to choose a different attitude at times. In the Attitude of 
Reflection, the fictions of the Natural Attitude can be put aside, in an attempt to see the effect 
of one’s concepts on one’s view of the world, in much the same way as one can consider the 
effect of one’s glasses on one’s visual perception. 
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In everyday life, people move without concern between the Natural Attitude and an 
attitude of reflection. For example, the everyday terms sunrise and sunset, with their Natural 
Attitude view of the sun revolving round the earth, continue to be used even though scientific 
discourse requires acceptance of the reflective attitude view that it is the earth that revolves 
around the sun.  
However, though in fairly neutral contexts like this, the move between Natural and 
reflective attitudes is easy, there can sometimes be resistance to the reflective attitude view. 
For example, it is one thing to accept the general principle that behaviour is driven by 
concepts, not reality, or to say it of someone else’s behaviour. It is another to admit that one’s 
own behaviour is driven by concepts, not reality. There is a sense in which people cling to, or 
get stuck in, the Natural Attitude.  
Unfortunately scientists and philosophers are far from immune from getting stuck in 
this way. They can recognise the general principle that words relate to concepts not reality, 
and yet have a wish to behave as if their own scientific words relate directly to reality, 
justifying the use of these words by reference to their accurate portrayal of reality. This can 
cause particular irony when scientists or philosophers studying words and concepts use words 
and concepts in a way that conflicts with their own findings about words and concepts - which 
is why the Phenomenologists take such care to recognise that they themselves, as theorists, 
are Subjects just like the Subjects they study. 
 
II.7. Theorising words and concepts 
 
Everyday reasoning, as we have seen, involves an understanding of words and concepts that is 
very similar to the one just outlined, and makes frequent reference to the role of words and 
concepts in reasoning and behaviour. It is common knowledge that different people can have 
different concepts of the same ‘raw reality’, depending on their culture, point of view and 
context. If someone says ‘It’s a great movie’, we do not accept that as an objective statement 
of fact, but interpret it in light of who has said it, and in what context, and come to our own 
judgment about the likely quality of the movie. In contemporary debate about important social 
or political issues, the role of language and context in shaping opinion is extremely well 
understood - perhaps at least partly through the influence of linguistics (Elgin, 1999). 
Theories of language and cognition seek more scientific understanding of the role of 
words and concepts. Mainstream theories have a rather specific understanding of what it 
means to be scientific, based on the practices of the natural sciences. The natural sciences, 
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recognising that words and concepts intervene between reality and people’s understanding of 
it, have traditionally sought to bypass words and concepts in attaining an understanding of 
reality itself. This is achieved through ensuring that all statements are based on verifiable 
observations. Of course it is recognised that the ability to achieve complete objectivity is 
limited (Feynman, 1986). However the ongoing attempt is seen as the path to scientific 
understanding of the natural world. 
Applying this criterion to the scientific study of language and cognition however 
creates some problems. It is of course possible and necessary to treat language and cognition 
in a scientific manner, but in doing so it is not possible to bypass words and concepts, since 
they are key elements of the subject matter being studied, as well as the vehicle via which 
they can be studied. Traditionally rigour in theories of language and cognition has come from 
explicit definition of terms, and justification of the definition by appeal to the relationship 
between the terms and the reality they refer to. 
The problem is, of course, that according to these theorists’ own understanding of 
language and cognition, there is no direct relationship between reality and words. The 
relationship must always be mediated through concepts - which must always belong to an 
embodied Subject in a personal and social context. The natural sciences can get away (up to a 
point) with ignoring this uncomfortable fact, by behaving as if all scientific concepts belong 
to some generalised ‘scientific Subject’ with a particular point of view that all scientists are 
willing to subscribe to. In the sciences of language and cognition, however, there are 
unavoidably two Subjects to consider, the one being studied and the one doing the studying. 
Terms within the theory need to be defined from the point of view of one or the other, and the 
issue cannot be fudged for long without theoretical confusion arising. 
For this reason, the phenomenological approach to rigour is different. The traditional 
approach is an attempt to escape from the Natural Attitude by denying it. According to 
Phenomenology, the only hope of avoiding the bad effects of the Natural Attitude on theory is 
to acknowledge it. Rigour in Phenomenology, then, comes from careful analysis of the words 
and concepts used in theories, not to eliminate their Subjectivity but to understand their 
presuppositions and ensure that these are commensurate with the context in which they are 
being used.  
The phenomenological method therefore involves not defining the terms used in 
theories once and for all, but asking Framework Questions of each term in the context that it 
is used. Framework Questions are questions like the following: 
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• what concept lies behind this term? 
• what ‘bit of reality’ lies behind this concept? 
• what kind of person can have this concept? 
• what prior concepts does that person need to have? 
• in what context does that ‘bit of reality’ have to occur to be conceptualised in this 
way? 
 
Through asking questions like this, a better understanding can be gained of the relative 
abstractness and other characteristics of the concepts behind the words used in theories.  
 
III. PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHONOLOGY 
 
III.1. Overview 
 
Phonology is the study of the sounds of speech, and how they function to help us convey 
meaning in language. It has been barely touched as a topic of study in Phenomenology (Ihde, 
1976; Merleau-Ponty, 1962), perhaps because most of the interesting questions of phonology 
arise from technical discoveries (Perkell & Klatt, 1986) that have impinged little on the more 
philosophical work of the Phenomenologists.  
Mainstream phonology, on the other hand, has had almost no exposure, even indirectly, 
to Phenomenology. Even those aspects of phenomenological thinking that are well known in 
other branches of linguistics (e.g. the idea that words relate to concepts not to reality, and that 
concepts cannot be defined simply by listing physical features of the reality they relate to) are 
rarely the focus of attention in phonology. Thus it is absolutely standard in mainstream 
phonology to define phonemes as a set (whether a list or a ‘geometry’) of physical features, 
and to understand phonetic features as being ‘closer to reality’ than phonological features. 
Cognitive Phonology, again, is exceptional in the degree to which it has questioned these 
mainstream ideas, with several scholars looking at the implications of treating phonemes not 
as sets of features but as categories of sounds (Nathan, 1986, 1996; Taylor, 2003).  
This section summarises very briefly an investigation of how phonology might be 
treated from a phenomenological perspective. 
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III.2. Phonological terms 
 
The first step in developing phonology from a phenomenological perspective is to 
acknowledge that the terms used in a theory of phonology (terms such as word, syllable, 
phoneme, feature, alveolar, and so on) are words like any other words, subject to all the 
principles discussed above. They refer to concepts of reality, not to reality itself, and people 
who use them are prone to get caught up in the Natural Attitude. It is essential therefore to ask 
the Framework Questions about the terms used in phonological theories.  
The reality behind any phonological terms is what might be called ‘raw speech’ -- the 
rich, complex, highly structured, quasi-continuous sound produced by the vocal tract when 
someone talks. Of course, to give a description of any kind to raw speech requires first 
conceptualising it, thus rendering it no longer ‘raw’, and limiting it to only one of its possible 
descriptions rather than any of the many others. One way to refer to raw speech without 
limiting it in this way, is to ‘point’ to the shared experience of hearing speech without 
understanding the words, for example when listening to someone speak an unknown 
language. The aim of the exercise of course is not describe the raw speech neutrally (which is 
impossible), but rather to demonstrate the degree to which everyday descriptions of speech in 
terms of words are abstract, or ‘processed’, with respect to the raw reality - in the senses 
developed above.  
An analogy with the crow of the rooster is sometimes helpful in elaborating the 
distinction between raw speech and words. The rooster can be described as saying 
‘cockadoodle-doo’ (or its equivalent in another language). It can also be experienced as 
uttering a ‘raw crow’ - a very different sound from the English word ‘cockadoodle-doo’. 
Similarly, a person can be described as saying ‘Could you pass the salt please?’ In this case it 
is more difficult to discern a difference between the words and the reality, but it is possible to 
think of the ‘raw speech’ behind the words by imagining how the sentence might seem to 
someone who does not know English, or to an animal which does not understand language, or 
to a machine set up to record the speech.  
Between raw speech and the phonological terms used to describe it are, of course, 
concepts - as is the case for any words. There are many different ways of conceptualising raw 
speech. There is nothing inherently right or wrong about any of these concepts, but each has 
presuppositions that need to be taken into account when using them in theories.  
Before raw speech can be understood as meaningful language, it must first be 
conceptualised as a string of words. It is interesting that in everyday life, people rarely 
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actually describe speech as a sequence of words. Conceptualising speech as a sequence of 
words has become so obvious to them, through learning a native language, that they no longer 
notice they do it, and have few metalinguistic terms to describe the sounds of words, as 
opposed to their meanings.  
One common way for phonologists to conceptualise speech is as a string of phonemes. 
Asking the framework questions shows that in order to have a concept of phoneme, it is 
necessary to know a large number of words, and to be able to compare and contrast the 
sounds of those words in a very particular manner (Byrne, 1998), which may only become 
possible through learning alphabetic literacy (Coulmas, 1989; Linell, 1988; Olson, 1996). The 
concept of phoneme thus presupposes a Subject that knows the language, is literate in an 
alphabetic writing system, and, arguably, has undergone some basic training in linguistics 
(Scarborough et al., 1998).  
Another common way for phonologists to conceptualise speech is as a sequence of 
allophones. Pursuing the framework questions reveals that the concept of allophone 
presupposes a concept of phoneme. Raw speech, as discussed earlier, is continuous, and 
continuously variable. It is not possible to segment it into allophones without having some 
prior understanding of its phonemic segmentation (Laver, 1994).  
Although these and other conceptualisations of speech seem very obvious to 
phonologists, it is not difficult to demonstrate that the most basic way for someone who 
knows the language to conceptualise speech is as neither phonemes nor allophones, but as a 
sequence of meaningful words. This is shown by the fact that it is almost impossible to listen 
to a language you know without hearing it as words. Though these word-concepts are not 
noticed, as discussed above, recognition of them underpins all other concepts of the sound of 
speech, which are more abstract. 
 
III.3. Abstractness of phonological terms 
 
Using answers to the Framework Questions along the lines just indicated, it is possible to set 
up a hierarchy of abstractness of phonological terms, based on understanding of the processes 
of abstraction required to create the concepts the terms refer to.  
From all that has been said so far (and see also more detail in the references given in the 
Introduction) it is clear that the metalinguistic concept behind the term word is abstract with 
respect to raw speech. Terms for parts of words, such as phoneme or syllable, refer to 
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considerably more abstract concepts, and terms for phonetic concepts such as allophone or 
pitch trace, are more abstract still.  
Compelling as this view is when argued from the principles outlined above, however, it 
is highly unorthodox in relation to mainstream phonological theory. Mainstream theory would 
certainly agree that words are abstract with respect to raw speech. However it would see 
phonetic representations as less rather than more abstract than words, closer to the reality of 
actual pronunciation. Phonemic representation is universally agreed, among mainstream 
theories, to be more abstract than phonetic, and words more abstract again, because of their 
even less direct mapping onto raw speech. 
How are these two strongly opposed views to be reconciled? It is natural to think that 
one must be right and the other wrong. However this may not be the most helpful approach. 
Rather than seeking universal accuracy or objectivity, it is possible to recognise that there are 
various ways of conceptualising abstractness, each with a range of presuppositions.  
In many contexts the traditional hierarchy is perfectly appropriate. For example, if 
linguists are theorising language for descriptive or typological purposes, intending to 
communicate findings primarily with other phonologists who have a common goal of 
predicting and accounting for characteristics of the sound systems of language, it is very 
useful to be able to refer to rules that change one sound into another, or constraints that 
restrict the appearance of certain sound combinations -- without worrying whether sounds 
really change into other sounds, or whether it is people who change the way they speak, or 
become aware of different relationships among sounds (Ohala, 1990). 
In other contexts, rather than acting merely as Subjects theorising language, linguists 
act as Subjects theorising other Subjects’ use of language. Sometimes this is done in a 
context, such as in developing phonological theory for speech technology, which makes an 
analogy between the Subject and a computational device. In this case as well the traditional 
hierarchy is appropriate to the extent it is useful in achieving the goal. 
A crucial change of context comes, however, when linguists aim to theorise a living 
human being seeking to accomplish some phonological task, such as acquiring literacy or 
learning pronunciation. To model such a Subject as a computational device is to distort its 
nature. To maintain the mainstream hierarchy of abstractness is to ascribe concepts to 
Subjects at stages of development, or stages of mental processing, at which it is impossible 
that such a concept could exist. 
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The important thing is to choose a hierarchy of abstractness, and other theoretical 
commitments, whose presuppositions are commensurate with the context in which it is to be 
used. Asking the Framework Questions can help with this. 
 
IV. APPLYING PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHONOLOGY TO PRONUNCIATION 
TEACHING 
 
It is well known that people learning a second language in adulthood often have particular 
difficulty mastering its pronunciation. It is often taken for granted that this difficulty stems 
from the physical difficulty of producing the sounds of the new language. On this view, 
teaching pronunciation involves showing students ‘the sounds you are actually making’, via 
acoustic or articulatory representations. This, unfortunately is often far less successful than is 
hoped. From the PP point of view, that is hardly surprising. Although in phonology 
articulatory and acoustic descriptions of speech are seen as being ‘close to reality’, according 
to the PP hierarchy, as discussed earlier, these are highly abstract representations, and a great 
deal of prior knowledge is required in order to interpret them, and to associate them with 
particular ways of speaking. Learners of second language pronunciation typically do not have 
that prior knowledge, and find it very difficult to relate the visual representations to their own 
pronunciation behaviour. 
PP takes a different view of how to teach pronunciation. Pronunciation is a form of 
behaviour. As such, it is driven by concepts. On this view, difficulties with pronunciation are 
primarily conceptual difficulties. This is supported by the observation that, though of course 
some pronunciation problems are caused by physical difficulty in producing particular 
sounds, in many cases, the speaker has no difficulty producing an acceptable version of the 
needed sounds. A classic case is the speaker who calls two girls Arison and Blonwyn. This 
person can clearly say both [r] and [l]. The problem is not in pronouncing the sounds, but in 
keeping them mentally distinct, as appropriate for the new language. 
If pronunciation is driven by concepts, the key to changing pronunciation is changing 
the concepts that drive it. This will not instantly solve all pronunciation difficulties. 
Pronunciation is a skill, and requires practice. However, without attention to the conceptual 
level, practice alone is frequently ineffective, and therefore discouraging. If the conceptual 
issues are addressed first, practice can be rewarding, and improvement follows far more 
quickly (Couper, 2006). 
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Principles for helping students form or modify concepts are well known to education 
(Lefrancois, 1994), and especially to communicative language teaching (McKay, 2002). They 
include principles such as ensuring that materials are meaningful, contextualised and 
culturally appropriate, that students are actively involved in learning rather than passively 
receiving information, that learning follows a series of incremental steps building new 
concepts from existing concepts, that students take responsibility for their own learning 
through self-reflection and other meta-cognitive skills. Such principles fit extremely well with 
PP and can be easily adapted to pronunciation teaching, by someone who understands 
principles of PP. Unfortunately however the major shift to communicative language teaching 
that took place in the 1970s and 1980s did not give detailed consideration to pronunciation 
(Celce-Murcia et al., 1996). This may have been because at that time there was a gulf between 
theoretical phonology, which was strongly influenced by the computational analogy, and 
language teaching, which required a more humanistic perspective. The result is that, while 
many teachers successfully use methods of teaching pronunciation that conform to a greater 
or lesser degree to PP principles (Fraser, 2000), many do not consider themselves successful 
pronunciation teachers, and many do not teach pronunciation at all (Macdonald, 2002).  
Even when concept formation practices are used successfully, however, they are 
generally not understood explicitly as concept formation practices. This is because, when 
second language pronunciation teaching is theorised, it is still generally from the perspective 
of mainstream phonological theory. Applying mainstream computational theory in the 
classroom emphasises the need to teach phonological rules. Teaching such rules has its place, 
and can be successful if used sensitively. However it is all too easy for students to focus on 
learning the rules as abstract facts, rather than learning pronunciation. The result can often be 
that students can recite rules of pronunciation in pronunciation that itself violates the rules. 
PP allows theorists to start with observation of what works best in the classroom, and 
create explanations which in turn allow the successful practice to be explored and extended in 
useful ways. The remainder of this section looks very briefly at just two principles of PP that 
can be used effectively in pronunciation teaching. 
The first has to do with metalinguistic communication -- the communication that takes 
place between teacher and students about pronunciation. It is an obvious principle of concept 
formation that students should be able to understand what their teacher tells them about the 
concepts they are learning. It can be surprising to find, then, just how frequently students’ and 
teachers’ descriptions of pronunciation pass each other by completely, and how challenging it 
can be to remedy this and ensure successful metalinguistic communication.  
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Thus to tell a student that they have put the stress on the wrong syllable may seem to be 
a clear statement of fact. However people from different language and education backgrounds 
may have a very different concept of what phonetic characteristics constitute stress, or no 
concept of stress at all. Unless the teacher has taken care to build up the concepts that the 
student needs to share, it can prove to be very difficult for the student to understand and act on 
the teacher’s advice.  
People from different language and literacy backgrounds have very different 
phonological concepts (Strange, 1995). Communicating about pronunciation is therefore 
fraught with many opportunities for misunderstanding. It can be useful to think of 
metalinguistic communication as a form of intercultural communication. Metalinguistic 
communication is even more challenging than general intercultural communication, however. 
People tend to be aware of the possibility of different cultural concepts behind words like 
‘polite’, or ‘respect’, but descriptions of sounds are thought to be objective, and 
misunderstanding is not expected. 
A second useful principle brought into focus by attention to principles of concept 
formation is the use of contrast. As discussed above, contrast is essential for concept 
formation - but what sort of contrast is most effective for learners? Minimal pairs have been 
used in pronunciation teaching for many years (Baker, 1981), and can certainly be useful if 
incorporated into meaningful contexts. However minimal pairs are a very specific and rather 
abstract form of contrast. Another way to exploit the principle of contrast in pronunciation 
teaching is to focus on the contrast between what the learner thinks they said and what a 
native speaker would think they had said (Cartwright & Fraser, forthcoming).  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Having started with a question as to the relationship between Cognitive Phonology and 
Phenomenological Phonology, it may be appropriate to finish with a suggestion as to how the 
question might be answered. 
It seems the two approaches are very similar. CP is more established as a theory, within 
the broader framework of Cognitive Linguistics. Indeed PP has benefited greatly from the 
insights of CP, as well as Cognitive Linguistics more generally. PP perhaps has the advantage 
of its origins as a re-creation from first principles of the fundamentals of phonology in light of 
insights from both Phenomenological philosophy and pronunciation teaching practice. This 
has enabled PP to question and in some cases reject assumptions from mainstream phonology 
 Helen Fraser 
 
© Servicio de Publicaciones. Universidad de Murcia. All rights reserved.            IJES, vol. 6 (2), 2006, pp. 55-75 
72
which CP, despite its differences from mainstream theory, still accepts as axiomatic. The 
relative abstractness of concepts such as WORD, PHONEME and ALLOPHONE is a key example. 
More detailed discussion of this and other issues, along with suggested implications for 
applying Cognitive Phonology in the socially relevant domains of pronunciation and literacy 
teaching practice, are set out in further work by the author (Fraser, submitted). 
 
 
NOTES  
 
1. This paper is based on a presentation given at the Phonology Theme Session, International 
Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Seoul in July 2005. The author thanks the audience, as well 
as anonymous reviewers of this paper, for useful comments and suggestions. 
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